In this post, I’d like to revisit a debate from early 2024, when Trump suggested that he would not favor defending Nato members that spent less than 2% of GDP on defense. Here’s what Tyler Cowen said at the time:
As you probably know, Trump threatened to let NATO countries that failed to meet the two percent of gdp defense budget obligation fend for themselves against Putin (video here, with Canadian commentary). Trump even said he would encourage the attacker.
Long-time MR readers will know I am not fond of Trump, either as a president or otherwise. (And I am very fond of NATO.) But on this issue I think he is basically correct. Yes, I know all about backlash effects. But so many NATO members do not keep up serious defense capabilities. And for decades none of our jawboning has worked.
Personally, I would not have proceeded or spoken as Trump did, and I do not address the collective action problems in my own sphere of work and life in a comparable manner (“if you’re not ready with enough publications for tenure, we’ll let Bukele take you!” or “Spinoza, if you don’t stop scratching the couch, I won’t protect you against the coyotes!”). So if you wish to take that as a condemnation of Trump, so be it. Nonetheless, I cannot help but feel there is some room for an “unreasonable” approach on this issue, whether or not I am the one to carry that ball.
That’s a plausible argument, but I had a different view:
I believe that both Trump and Tyler misunderstand the role of Nato. The most important aspect of Nato is not the amount it spends on the military, rather its role is to provide a mutual defense pact so large that no nation would dare to attack even its tiniest members. In that regard, it’s a smashing success.
Consider the recent war in the Ukraine, where Russia has been stalemated for 2 years. To say that Ukraine is weaker than Nato would be an understatement. Nato has 31 members, many of which are individually richer and more powerful than Ukraine. As long as Nato sticks together, Russia would not dare to attack even a small member like Estonia. It makes essentially no difference whether Germany spends 1.4% or 2.0% of GDP on its military. Nato is ten times over impregnable, if it sticks together.
But will Nato stick together? Late in his first term, Trump told aides that he hoped to pull the US out of Nato in his second term. That’s why Putin desperately wants Trump to win the election.
Over the past two months, events have tended to confirm that my worry was justified. Consider the following:
1. The 2nd Trump administration has been exceedingly hostile to Nato, with key members suggesting that the US leave the alliance. This despite the fact that most of the important members of Nato have recently boosted spending to a level above the 2% threshold demanded by Nato critics (see below.)
2. Yes, there’s a reasonable argument that even 2% of GDP is too low, as the US spends over 3% of GDP on defense. But Trump now demands at least 5% of GDP, a figure that he surely understands is not going to be met by countries already struggling to finance their big welfare states, and is an obvious pretext for the US to walk away from the alliance. That’s the sort of demand you make if you want the alliance to fail. Trump lacks the legal authority to explicitly exit Nato, but he’s doing everything he can to create the impression of a de facto exit.
3. In the Ukraine War, Trump has switched US support from Ukraine and Nato to Russia. Before the election, my critics pointed to the fact that the first Trump administration was fairly tough on Russia, suggesting I was delusional to view Trump as pro-Putin. They failed to understand that in his first administration Trump farmed out foreign policy to some mainstream Republicans. But during the campaign Trump promised a radically different approach in his second term, a promise he has fulfilled. The US is now voting with Russia and against Europe on the question of whether Russia is to blame for the war. (Even China abstained!) The US government calls Zelensky a “dictator” but refuses to call Putin a dictator. Far from being delusional, I actually underestimated Trump’s support for Russia. I expected him to cut off financial support for Ukraine, but didn’t expect him to needlessly hurt Ukraine in ways that did not save the US government any money, such as cutting off intelligence sharing and voting against resolutions that condemned Russia for the war.
Like Tyler, I am “very fond of Nato”; indeed, I regard it as one of the best innovations of the post-WWII era, an organization that moved Europe past the destructive nationalism of the first half of the 20th century. I can imagine how a supporter of this sort of multinational organization could favor putting pressure on its members in order to make the alliance stronger. That was Tyler’s view. But Trump is not a supporter of multilateral organizations; he is an avowed nationalist. He opposes Nato, just as he opposes the EU, Nafta, and even his own renegotiated version of Nafta (USMCA).
When you argue that a controversial figure may have a valid point in one particular area, you need to be careful that the valid point they have in mind is the same as the valid point that you have in mind. In the case of Tyler Cowen, Donald Trump and Nato, I don’t believe that was the case.
Some readers agree with me on economics but disagree with me on foreign policy. So let me address that group with an analogy. Suppose you are the sort of person that basically likes free markets, but didn’t at all care for the Trudeau government, and also believes the US has a few valid complaints about Canadian trade policy. What would be the optimal US strategy?
Perhaps the US government might quietly reach out and ask to renegotiate a few specific points, trading some favors to Canada in exchange for favors from Canada. I’m not sure this was necessary, but I can see how someone might hold that view. Perhaps the US would choose to wait until after the Canadian election, as the Conservative Party had a 25% lead in the polls, which was growing over time.
Now consider the effects of the recent US-Canada trade war:
1. The Canadian election is now a dead heat, almost entirely due to the fact that the Canadian public is outraged by US bullying. The party you favor might well lose an election that weeks before was a lock.
2. An anti-American mood in Canada makes it very difficult for any Canadian government to offer trade concessions; far more difficult than it would have been had the administration had a sincere desire to work quietly and cooperatively toward a win-win solution.
So what’s my point? It not enough to say you don’t like the current structure of Nato, or you don’t like the current structure of global trade. Not every critic of those structures will be offering constructive solutions. Some critics are nihilists, who simply want to blow it all up and start over.
Many people don’t like international organizations. But I suspect they will be missed when they are gone. If smaller countries cannot rely on military alliances, they’ll need to develop their own nuclear deterrent. Do you wish to see a world with dozens of nuclear powers?
What could go wrong?
Here’s the BBC’s estimate of Nato military spending:
