In previous posts, I’ve criticized ambiguity in foreign policy. I cited the example of the Gulf War (1991), which occurred because a US official gave Saddam Hussein the impression that we would not object to an invasion of Kuwait. That was clearly an incorrect signal, and as a result we were drawn into a costly war. It also seems likely that the subsequent Iraq War (2003) would not have occurred without the previous Gulf War. Saddam almost certainly would not have invaded Kuwait if the US has correctly explained its intended response before the invasion, as his mistake ended up proving to be very costly.
Jordan Schneider and Jonathon Sine recently interviewed Sergey Radchenko, who had this to say about the events leading up to the Korean War:
Kim Il-sung in North Korea wanted to reunify the country and kept asking Stalin for permission, saying, “Comrade Stalin, the moment we cross over the 38th parallel, there will be revolution in South Korea. Everything will turn out just fine. It’ll be very quick.” Stalin would refuse him permission to do that time and again. The reason for that is pretty obvious — Stalin was worried about American intervention. He was a very cautious individual in this particular instance. . . .
The question is, why does Stalin change his mind from thinking that the Americans might intervene to thinking that they will not intervene? That is where it becomes complicated.
First of all, we have Dean Acheson’s remarks in the press conference, which are straightforward, where he says, “America has a defensive perimeter, which does not include Korea.” That is probably the most misguided statement ever made by an American foreign policymaker. That, in retrospect, was a very bad idea. . . .
Even Mao himself did not know what was going on. Stalin did not inform him.
Then I see Anastas Mikoyan’s response, which is, “Our intelligence intercepted cables by the Americans that said that they would not intervene in the conflict.”
The entire interview is quite interesting and well worth reading.
If this claim is correct, then a war that resulted in 3 million deaths occurred because the US had an ambiguous policy regarding our willingness to defend South Korea.
To be sure, it is possible that North Korea might have eventually invaded South Korea even without Stalin’s approval. But if the invasion had been delayed by a few decades, it would have given the South more time to build up its defense forces (perhaps with US assistance.)
So now we have two or even three wars that may have occurred because the US sent out ambiguous signals on our willingness to defend various countries. Does this have any implications for today?
Both the Biden and the Trump administrations have made it pretty clear that we will not use US troops to defend Ukraine. So I see no major ambiguity on that front. But elsewhere, policy ambiguity is rising sharply.
The Biden administration was firmly committed to Nato, which commits each member to come to the defense of other members if attacked. For instance, a number of Nato members helped the US in Afghanistan after the 9-11 attacks. President Trump has sent out mixed signals on Nato, and thus it is no longer clear that the US government is committed to this organization. That increases the risk of miscalculation in some place like the Baltic region.
With regard to Taiwan, there were mixed signals even within the Biden administration. President Biden would occasionally suggest that the US was committed to defend Taiwan if attacked, only to have other administration officials walk back these statements and restore “strategic ambiguity.” In contrast, President Trump has not firmly committed to defend Taiwan.
In this post, I’m not trying to defend any particular Taiwan policy. (I’m not a fan of either the Biden or the Trump approach.). Rather, I am trying to describe how previous examples of policy ambiguity have led to some costly foreign policy disasters, and also show that in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in policy uncertainty.
How can we have more transparency and clarity in US foreign policy? One approach would be to return to the original intent of the Constitution, and have Congress make decisions on whether or not to go to war. Because the Senate has 100 members, it is easier to predict its response to foreign aggression than it is to predict the response of a single individual (i.e., the President). There’s also the “wisdom of crowds”, which suggests that decisions made by large groups are usually superior to those made by a single individual. (Tariffs are another area where the founders thought it wise to give Congress the authority.)
PS. In general, it makes sense to have a foreign policy that reduces the “tail risk” of extremely bad outcomes. In my view, war between Mainland China and Taiwan would be very bad. But war between Mainland China and the US could be several orders of magnitude worse.
PPS. After writing this post, I noticed that a bunch of top administration officials were caught discussing war plans on an insecure Signal chat that included a reporter for The Atlantic, and then lied about it afterwards, even after the administration had confirmed the Atlantic story. There are so many other things going on that I suspect this story will be forgotten within 24 hours. So many scandals, so little time. The chat messages revealed some of things that I’ve been talking about:
For a continent already worried that Trump may not honor any NATO Article 5 request or would be willing to shake down allies by withholding the spare parts and software upgrades needed to keep their F-35 Joint Strike Fighters flying, the content of this unintentionally leaked discussion has provided confirmation. . . .
US allies in the Asia Pacific and Middle East can only conclude that this might soon be them, too, should Trump and his officials ever decide that they aren’t paying enough for their defense or making sufficient trade concessions.
Russia and China, meanwhile, will also draw conclusions, though viewed from their perspective this offers exploitable opportunities. At least as important as all this is that America’s friends and foes alike are finding out what happens when you get group of poorly qualified ideologues to run the most powerful military in the world. The short answer is either recklessness or, under a more generous interpretation, a group with a steep learning curve.
The chat discussion also revealed that when considering the pros and cons of this military action, the fact that it might also help Europe was viewed as a negative. (No, I’m not joking.) As I keep saying, the US has shifted its alliance from the West to Putin’s Russia. Here’s a Bloomberg story:
“Finlandization” is about weaker countries having to cede sovereignty to appease stronger bullies, such as Russia and, now, the US.
A few years ago, commenters viewed me as an anti-American extremist for claiming the US government was a “bully”. Now that view has gone mainstream.
