My latest paper, Pandemic Preparation Without Romance, has just appeared at Public Choice.
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic, despite its unprecedented scale, mirrored previous disasters in its predictable missteps in preparedness and response. Rather than blaming individual actors or assuming better leadership would have prevented disaster, I examine how standard political incentives—myopic voters, bureaucratic gridlock, and fear of blame—predictably produced an inadequate pandemic response. The analysis rejects romantic calls for institutional reform and instead proposes pragmatic solutions that work within existing political constraints: wastewater surveillance, prediction markets, pre-developed vaccine libraries, human challenge trials, a dedicated Pandemic Trust Fund, and temporary public–private partnerships. These mechanisms respect political realities while creating systems that can ameliorate future pandemics, potentially saving millions of lives and trillions in economic damage.
Here’s one bit:
…in the aftermath of an inadequate government response to an emergency, we often hear calls to reorganize and streamline processes and to establish a single authority with clear responsibility and decision-making power to overcome bureaucratic gridlock. By centralizing authority, it is argued that the government can respond more swiftly and effectively, reducing the inefficiencies caused by a fragmented system.
Yet, the tragedy of the anti-commons was also cited to explain the failure of the government after 9/11. Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security was created to centralize a fragmented system and allow it to act with alacrity. Isn’t a pandemic a threat to homeland security? And what about the Swine Flu pandemic of 2009? While not nearly as deadly as the COVID pandemic, 60 million Americans were sickened, some 274 thousand hospitalized with over 12 thousand deaths (Shresha et al. 2011). Wasn’t this enough practice to act swiftly?
Rather than advocating for a reorganization of bureaucracies, I propose accepting the tragedy of the anti-commons as an inevitable reality. The tragedy of the commons is an equilibrium outcome of modern-day bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has its reasons and some of those reasons may even be reasonable (Wittman 1995). It is too much to expect the same institution to respond to the ordinary demands of day-to-day politics and to the very different demands of emergencies. Indeed, when an institution evolves to meet the demands of day-to-day politics it inevitably develops culture, procedures and processes that are not optimized for emergencies.
Instead of rearranging organization charts we should focus on what has proven effective: the creation of ad-hoc, temporary, public–private organizations. Two notable examples are Operation Warp Speed in the United States and the British Vaccine Taskforce. These entities were established quickly and operated outside regular government channels, free from the typical procurement, hiring, or oversight rules that hinder standard bureaucracies.
…Operation Warp Speed exemplified the “American Model” of emergency response. Rather than relying on command-and-control or government production, the American Model leverages the tremendous purchasing power of the US government with the agility and innovation of the private sector.
The only problem with the “American Model” was its inconsistent application.
I am especially fond of this paper because it is the first, to my knowledge, to cite separate papers from Alex, Maxwell and Connor Tabarrok.
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