Now, you might think that the US figure is inflated by the notorious bloat within the American military-industrial complex. I would be the last person who would wish to minimize that. But the evidence suggests that the bias may be the other way around. American defense dollars likely go further than European euros.
Look for instance at the price of modern, third-generation battle tanks and the cost of self-propelled howitzers, which have been key to the fighting in Ukraine. German prices are far higher than their American counterparts.
And, as work by Juan Mejino-López and Guntram B. Wolff at the Bruegel policy think tank has shown, these higher costs have to do with smaller procurement runs and smaller procurement runs are, in turn, tied to the fragmentation of Europe’s militaries and their strong preference for national procurement.
Right-now there is often lamentation about the tendency of European militaries to import key weapons systems from the US. And there is, of course, plenty of geopolitical and political maneuvering involved, for instance, in Berlin’s initiative to build an air defense system heavily reliant American and Israeli missiles. As the data show, Germany does have a strong preference for imports from the US rather than its European neighbors.
But, on average, across the entire defense budget, the besetting sin of European militaries is not that they rely too heavily on foreign weapons, but that they import not enough. They are too self-sufficient. The problem is not that Germany buys too many weapons from the US, but that it buys too many in Germany.
National fragmentation creates the balkanized defense market, the inefficient proliferation of major weapons systems and in terms of global industrial competition, the small size of European defense contractors.
Here is the full Substack, very good throughout. Via Felipe.
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