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The writer is associate professor of political science at Providence College and author of the forthcoming book ‘Extraction: The Frontiers of Green Capitalism’
Critical minerals have topped the agenda since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. On inauguration day, he released an executive order, “Unleashing American Energy”. With characteristic bluster, this seeks to secure “America’s mineral dominance”. He has also issued a related executive order (“Addressing the threat to national security from imports of copper”), threatened to seize Greenland and annex Canada, which have enviable mineral endowments, bullied Ukraine to accept a minerals deal (“they have great rare earth. And I want security of the rare earth”), and announced imminent additional action to “dramatically expand production of critical minerals and rare earths here in the USA”.
Trump’s bellicose rhetoric and menacing behaviour has been rightly criticised but he is not acting in a vacuum. Last year, the EU signed a critical minerals deal with Rwanda. The European parliament voted to suspend the deal, however, because Rwanda is supporting a rebellion in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo partly in order to seize and export the region’s coltan, tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold.
Meanwhile, the government of the DR Congo, led by Félix Tshisekedi, has proposed a critical minerals deal to the US, modelled on the stalled Ukraine agreement. Tshisekedi pitched the idea of privileged access for US companies to abundant cobalt and copper reserves in exchange for security assistance in its fight with the M23 rebels. Vladimir Putin too saw the Ukraine deal as a model, offering Trump access to Russia’s minerals — as well as those in Ukrainian territories his military controls.
These deals are part of a broader trend. Importing countries are racing to secure minerals, using a mix of onshoring (encouraging mining within their borders) and bilateral trade agreements. Producing countries are implementing export bans, establishing state-owned companies and in some cases nationalising entire mineral sectors. Whether justified on account of the energy transition, tech sectors or military preparedness, countries everywhere want their piece of the critical mineral pie.
In the US, Trump’s moves mark the escalation of a bipartisan consensus that has been over a decade in the making. It was during Barack Obama’s presidency that federal officials first outlined a “critical minerals strategy”. In Trump’s first term, executive orders expanded the list of critical minerals and framed reliance on imports from foreign adversaries as a threat. Joe Biden’s administration increased domestic mining, established friendshoring alliances and imposed major tariffs on minerals from China.
Some previous US policies bear an unsettling resemblance to Trump’s recent bluster too. Under Biden, for example, the state department lobbied the CEO of privately held Tanbreez to resist any offers from Chinese investors for its Greenland rare earth deposit.
There is an even longer history at work here. The concept of “critical minerals” traces its origins to the lead-up to the second world war and was reinforced during the cold war race for atomic materials and the 1970s energy crisis. At each moment, labelling resources as “critical” has justified government support for extraction and access, deregulation of safeguards, and a preference for strong-arm tactics over co-operation. The consequences are deadly: mining ranks high among economic sectors for human rights violations.
The idea of “critical minerals” shuts down debate. Critical for who? And extracted for whose benefit and whose expense? Instead of “mineral dominance” we need international agreements on environmental and social standards and policies that reduce mineral demand.
Otherwise, the critical minerals consensus is liable to lead us to a 21st-century gold rush or resource war.
